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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP
mdFARMERSINSURANCE
EXCHANGE,
Defendants and Respondents.

I

Case
No. 9625

1

APP·ELLANT''S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
The case on appeal and set forth herein involves the
problem and presents the question of whether or not
plaintiff, an excess liability insurance carrier, can recover
attorneys' fees and court costs from defendants, the
primary liability insurance carrier, when the latter has
failed, refused and neglected to defend an insured under
the terms of its policy, who is also the named insured
under the policy providing excess coverage, when the
insured was being sued by a third party for an amount
1
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within the limits of coverage provided by the primary
carrier, and when upon its refusal to defend said insured,
the excess carrier incurred attorneys' fees in a reasonable amount and court costs in successfully defending
the insured party.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial Court (Judge A. H. Ellett) held
that an excess liability insurance carrier cannot recover
attorneys' fees and court costs from a primary insurance
carrier which fees and costs were incurred in defending
a party who was an insured under the policy providing
primary coverage and who was the named insured under
the policy providing excess coverage when the insured
was being sued for an amount within the policy limits provided by the primary carrier.

RELIEF SOUGHT
The relief sought on this appeal is as follows:
A. Reversal of the lower Court's decision.
B. Order directing judgment to be entered in favor
of plaintiff and against defendants for the amount stipulated to by counsel at trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
John H. Morgan, Jr., was the named insured under a
policy of liability insurance issued to him by National

2
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Farmers Union Property and Casualty Company and
providing coverage on a 1958 Mercury automobile in
the amount of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per occurrence for bodily injury and $5,000 for property damage (TR 2, 7).
Raymond Earl Thomas was the named insured under
a policy of liability insurance issued to him by Farmers
Insurance Exchange and providing coverage on his automobile in the amount of $10,000 per person and $20,000
per occurrence for bodily injury and $5,000 for property
damage (TR 2, 7).
Mr. Morgan had purchased his vehicle at Bountiful
Motor Sales (then known as J. Golden Barton Motor
Company) where Mr. Thomas was employed as a car
salesman; however, Morgan did not purchase his car
from Thomas (TR 2). While Mr. Morgan was vacationing in Yellowstone Park in August, 1958, his vehicle was
involved in an automobile accident. He brought the
damaged automobile to Bountiful Motor Sales, Bountiful,
Utah, for repairs. In the course of the discussion between Mr. Morgan and Kay Browning, Service Manager
of Bountiful Motor Sales, a request was made by the
customer for the use of a service automobile while his
car was being repaired. Mr. Browning advised that no
such vehicle was available and obtained the use of the
automobile owned by Raymond Earl Thomas for Mr.
2\Iorgan (TR. 3). The borrowed automobile was owned by
~Ir. Thomas, and was insured under a policy issued to
him by Farmers Insurance Exchange, which he had obtained on his own behalf (TR 3). Upon receiving the car
3
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from its owner, Mr. Morgan drove to his home, parked it
on an incline nearby and went into his house. Shortly
thereafter Mr. Morgan's young daughter entered the
parked car, released the brake and sent it crashing into
the home of Daniel T. Wolfe, damaging the house in the
amount of $1,896.31 ( TR. 3, 4). Demand was made upon
Mr. Morgan by the owner of the house for the damages
thereto, and Morgan immediately contacted his insurance
carrier, appellant herein. He was advised that the coverage of National Farmers Union Property and Casualty
Company was excess in this situation and that he ought
to look to Farmers Insurance Group, the insurer of the
automobile causing the damage, for protection. This was
done and Mr. Morgan was advised that no coverage was
afforded by Farmers Insurance Exchange in this situation because its coverage was excess and in any event
coverage was excluded because the loaned vehicle was
being used in the automobile business at the time and
place of the accident.
In the meantime, legal action was instituted against
Mr. Morgan by Mr. Wolfe for the damages to his house;
Morgan thereupon again sought protection from appellant herein, who undertook the defense of the matter only
after the defense had been tendered to both Farmers Insurance Exchange and Bountiful :Motor Sales and refused
by both. Thereupon appellant herein, plaintiff in the
lower Court, proceeded with the defense of the lawsuit
against Mr. Morgan, was successful in that endeavor, but
in so doing incurred court costs and attorneys' fees in
the amount of $506.00 ( TR. 4, 5, 6)
4
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An action was subsequently commenced in the Third
Judicial District Court by appellant against respondents
to recover the attorneys' fees and court costs incurred
by it in defending the lawsuit described. The lower court
disposed of the rna tter as previously indica ted in this
brief (Tr. 4).
ARGUMENT
PoiNT

'I.

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN
ACCEPTING THE DEFENSE OF THE INSURED, UPON DEFENDANTS' REFUSAL TO
DO SO, PLAINTIFF WAS A VOLUNTEER
AND THEREFORE PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT
COSTS INCURRED IN DEFENDING THE
INSURED.
At the outset it may be well to indicate that in denying recovery against defendants by plaintiff, the lower
court did not use the word volunteer. However, an examination of the language used by the court in describing
plaintiff's conduct in handling the matter or in indicating
what plaintiff should or could have done, it is evident that
the court held that plaintiff was a volunteer (Tr. 10, 11).
Generally speaking the party making payment is a volunteer if in so doing he has no right or interest of his
own to protect and acts without obligation, moral or
legal, and without being requested by anyone liable on
the obligation. Where the person paying the debt has an
interest to protect he is not a stranger (50 Am. Jur., 698,
Section 22) .

5
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The problem involved in this appeal presents a case
of first impression in Utah but which has been dealt with
recently in several other states .

.Aetna Casualty & Surety Compa;ny v. Buckeye Union
CasuaUy Company, 157 Ohio St. 385, 105 N. E. 2d 568
(1952) discussed the volunteer aspect of a claim on facts
similar to those in the instant case. However, in the Ohio
case, Aetna, the secondary liability insurer, settled an
action for an amount within policy limits brought against
the insured party and ,sought to recover from Buckeye,
the primary insurer, the amount of the settlement and
costs in the sum of $2,660.81. The primary carrier had
disclaimed coverage refusing to defend or participate in
the settlement of the action. It should be noted at this
time that both the Aetna and Buckeye policies contained
Temporary Use of Substitute Automobile, Other Insurance, Subrogation, and Defense provisions the same or
similar to those contained in the policy of the parties to
this appeal. (See exhibits P-1 and D-2). The Ohio Supreme Court held that Aetna, as the secondary carrier,
which was forced to make settlement and pay to protect
itself, was entitled to recover from Buckeye, the primary
carrier. In allowing recovery, the Court had this to say:
Therefore, applying the principles of equity and
natural justice, Aetna has the equitable right to
recover from Buckeye and it also has the right to
recover by way of subrogation under the policy.

The .Aetna ca,se is distinguishable from Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Buckeye Union Casualty Company, 147 Ohio St. 79, 67 N.E. 2d 906, on which Buckeye
6
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relied to avoid liability in the former case because in the
Farm Bureau case both companies admitted coverage and
the liabilities of their insured for some amount of damages on the claim asserted. No action was instituted
against the insured and the Farm Bureau made full settlement without being forced to do so by court action.
Furthermore, the case did not involve primary and secondary coverage problems. Under those circumstances
the court held that there was no legal liability requiring
the settling company to make payment and consequently
that it was a volunteer.
A very recent Illinois case, Fireman's Fund Indemnity Comparny v. Freeport Insurance Compa.ny, 30 Ill.
App. 2d 69, 173 N.E. 2d 543 (1961) involved another primary-secondary insurance coverage dispute. There, Gail
Saraniecki, the gir1 friend of the son of the named insured
drove the insured car at the time of the accident with
implied permission of the insured. The girl's father had
a policy of insurance providing coverage upon himself
and members of his family while driving other vehicles.
A $100,000.00 suit was filed against the girl for injuries
arising out of the accident. She notified Freeport Insurance Company, the liability carrier on the automobile she
was driving, but it denied liability under the policy and
refused to defend. She also notified Fireman's Fund, her
father's insurance carrier, and it defended the action
upon Freeport's refusal to do so. Fireman's Fund
brought a declaratory judgment action for reimbursement of expenses incurred in defending the girl up to that
time. In holding that the primary carrier must reim7
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burse the secondary or excess carrier for expenses incurred in defending the driver the court said:
Since Freeport's policy does cover Gail Saraniecki
and is therefore primary, whe hold that Freeport
is also primarily responsible for the defense of
this suit. While it is true that Fireman's policy
also obligates them to defend, we think the policy
must be read as a whole, (Fogelmark v. Western
Casualty and Surety Company, 11 Ill. App. 2d
551, 137 N.E. 2d 879) and this obligation viewed
in light of its position as an excess carrier in this
particular situation. (173 N.E. 2d 543, 546.}
The court further stated on the same page in adopting
the words of the court in American Surety Company of
New York v. Canal Insurance Comparny, 4 Cir., 258 F.
2d 934:
Losses should not fall irrevocably upon that insurer which first recognizes its obligations, while
one neglectful of its duty is allowed to escape.
In the American Surety Company case as cited in the preceding paragraph, an excess insurer had investigated
and defended a tort action against its insured after the
primary insurer had been tendered the defense and had
refused it, and the insured was held liable for an amount
in excess of the primary insurance which the excess insurer paid. There the court allowed the excess insurer
to recover from the primary insurer the limits of the
primary policy as well as all costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees incurred in the investigation and defense of
the tort claim.
8
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The primary insurer was also held primarily responsible for defending its insured in McFarland v.
Chicago Exp., 7 Cir., 200 F. 2d 5 (1952), Oil Base, Inc. v.
Transport Indemnity Company, 143 Cal. App. 2d 453,
299 P. 2d 952 (1956).
Other cases involving the problem of recovery of
attorney fees and costs by an excess insurance carrier
against a primary insurance carrier are as follows: Continental Casualty Company v. American Fidelity and
CasuaUy Company, 275 F. 2d 381. Each company claimed
to be the excess carrier. The court awarded plaintiff who
was established as the excess carrier in the action the
amount of the judgment against the insured plus attorney fees for defending the action.

Allstate Insurance Company v. Hartford Accident
and Indemnity Company, 311 S.W. 2d 41 (Mo., 1958). Excess carrier was awarded judgment it paid in behalf of
the insured plus part of the attorney fees incurred in defending the action. It excluded that part of the attorney
fees incurred by the excess carrier in attempting to get
the primary carrier to defend the tort action. The attorney fees were separable, the total amount being $1,300.00
of which $600.00 was spent to implead defendant primary
carrier. This $600.00 was disallowed but plaintiff was
allowed to recover the $700.00 spent in defending the tort
action.
In Cosmopolitan Mutual Insurance Company v. Continental Casualty Company, 147 A. 2d 529 (N.J. 1959) the
court found neither party to be the primary insurance
9
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carrier and on that basis required the companies to split
the cost of settlement and fees incurred in disposing of
the claim against the insured.
In view of the facts involved in the case on appeal
herein and the cases cited in this brief, appellant contends
that as long as Farmers Insurance Exchange disclaimed
coverage and refused to participate in any way in either
negotiating settlement or defending the action against
John H. Morgan, Jr., there was no admitted or established
"other valid and collectible insurance" available to protect the insured and National Farmers Union was, therefore, forced to defend and pay any resulting judgment,
if unsuccessful in its efforts, or to settle the case. N ational Farmers Union could not abandon Morgan merely
because Farmers Insurance Exchange chose to deny
coverage and gamble on future exoneration. Aetna Casualty v. Buckeye Union Casualty, supra. National Farmers Union had an interest to protect and in defending the
insured in the original action was not a volunteer.
Appellant relies heavily on the case of Firemarn's
Fund Indemnity Company v. Freeport Insurance Company (supra) and asserts that it should not be penalized
for recognizing its obligation to one of its named insureds
when the insurance carrier with the primary obligation to
protect the insured refused to do so. That appellant was
successful in its defense of Mr. Morgan should not be to
its detriment. There can be no question that upon the
principles of equity and natural justice, and upon the
law, that National Farmers Union has the right to recover the attorney fees and court costs incurred by it in
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successfully defending the insured party. Farmers Insurance Exchange should not be permitted to escape ultimate liability costs and expenses incurred in defending
the insured merely by denying coverage and refusing to
defend the action. The Exchange should not be immunized from such payments by its own breach of contract.
See Klaustermeyer v. Clevela;nd Trust Company, Assignee, 89 Ohio St. 142, 105 N.E. 278.

PoiNT

II.

THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS INCURRED
IN DEFENDING THE INSURED ON THE
THEORY OF SUBROGATION.
It is well settled that one secondarily liable, who is
forced to pay because of the refusal or failure after demand, of the one primarily liable to discharge the obligation, has the right of indemnity from the one primarily
liable. Globe Indemnity Company v. Schmitt, 142 Ohio St.
595, 53 N.E. 2d 790, Maryland Casualty Compan.y v. Frederick Company, 142 Ohio St. 605, 53 N.E. 2d 795, Losito
v. Kruse, Jr., 136 Ohio St. 183, 24 N.E. 2d 705, 126 ALR
1194, Herron v. City of Y oun,gstown, 136 Ohio St. 190, 24
N.E. 2d 708, 31 A.L.R. 2d 1324 et seq.
However, the doctrine of subrogation, which is a device for the protection of a surety or indemnifier, is because of its very nature inapplicable where the one seeking subrogation is himself primarily liable. Builders and
Manufacturers' Mutual Casualty Company v. Preferred
11
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Auto Insurance Comp~y (1941 C.A. 6th Ohio) 118 F. 2d
118. By the same token, the doctrine is inapplicable if
the one against whom subrogation is sought is not found
to be the primary insurer. Michig(JJJ'b Alkali Company v.
Bankers Indemnity Company (1939, C.A. 2d NY) 103 F. 2d
345. And it has been held not to apply where the effect of
the respective policies was to establish equal liability.
Kenner v. Century Indemnity Company, 320 Mass. 6, 67
N.E. 2d 769, 165 ALR. 1463.
The District Court per Judge Ellett in the instant
case held that National Farmers Property and Casualty
Company, appellant herein, was the excess carrier and
that Farmers Insurance Exchange, respondent herein,
was the primary carrier, but refused to allow recovery
of defense costs and court costs under the theory of subrogation on the ground that such a theory is inapplicable
where no payment has been made under the policy, i.e.,
where the insured did not incur any defense costs or court
costs and since the company did not make any such payments for its insured then the insurance company could
not subrogate for the costs and the expenses incurred
by it.
Appellant urges that the approach of the trial court
to the subrogation attempt is academic. That the insured
actually incurred no costs and expenses in defending the
lawsuit because National Farmers Union undertook the
defense of the action, engaged and paid its own attorneys
for so doing is not to the point. It is true that appellant
could have abandoned Mr. Morgan as did respondent, let
the insured employ his own attorney, and actually incur
12
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all costs and expenses in defending himself. The insured
could then have paid for his defense and sought reimbursement from his insurance carrier; appellant might
then have reimbursed him as per the policy defenses provision and then sought recovery against the primary
insurer. Or, appellant might have undertaken the defense
of the insured but handled the matter in such a slothful
manner that judgment was sure to be entered against Mr.
Morgan. Then the excess carrier could have paid said
judgment and sought recovery by subrogating against
the primary carrier for the amount paid on the judgment
plus costs and expenses incurred in defending. Such an
approach may please the theorizing purist of the legal
profession, but is an approach which we think the excess
carrier need not, should not and could not pursue, nor is
it one which the insured need put up with. The effect of
refusing to allow the appellant to recover expenses and
costs on this ground is to penalize it for realizing its obligation in defending the insured when respondent abandoned him and then for its efficient and successful handling of the lawsuit against him.
The problem of subrogation against a judgment
creditor for costs expended by an insurance company in successfully defending its insured was discussed in Mu'J'Wh Brewery, Inc., v. Grief, 6 N.Y. S. 2d 989,
169 Mis. 382 (1928) and on appeal in 11 N. Y. S. 2d 126
(1939). That matter involved a motion to vacate and set
aside a subpoena for examination in supplemental proceedings of judgment debtor, Abraham Grief. In an
action that resulted in the judgment against Grief,
13
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judgment-debtors, plaintiffs, had instituted an action
against Munch Brewery and South Brooklyn Railway Company for personal injuries. Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Company, the
insurance carrier of judgment-creditor, Munch Brewery,
Inc., defended the action and was successful in getting a
no cause of action plus costs judgment for its insured.
The costs of $133.00 had been incurred by the insurance
company and not by the insured. It was in an attempt to
recover these costs on the theory of subrogation that the
insurance carrier had instituted the supplemental proceedings. The policy issued by Zurich to 11unch Brewery
contained standard provisions for legal liability for bodily injuries or death, expenses for defenses and
subrogation.
The trial court indicated that the subrogation clause
of the policy comes into play only where the insurance
company has had to pay a loss for damages. In 6 NYS
2d 989, 992, the court said:
If a judgment had been obtained against the
Munch Brewery, Inc., and was paid by the insurance carrier, in that event the carrier would by
virtue of the subrogation clause have a right of
action against the driver of the truck owned by the
insured or against co-defendant whose contributory negligence might have resulted in the injury
sustained.
The court further asserted that subrogation applies
to a right in the insurance company only in the event of
a payment under the policy. There must be payment by
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the company for and on behalf of its insured and until the
insurance carrier paid a claim or judgment it could not
bring an action as subrogee because its rights as subrogee does not accrue until then.
Defendant's motion to vacate the subpoena for examination in supplemental proceedings was granted.
On appeal to the appellate division of the Supreme
Court, 11 N.Y.S. 2d 126, the lower court was reversed.
At page 127, relating to the subrogation question, the
court said that pursuant to the policy the insurance company undertook to pay, in addition to damages, all expenses incurred by the company for investigation,
negotiation or defense. The Court then went on to say:
The insurance company is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the assured against the judgment-debtor ''as respects any payment made under this policy,'' for it had borne the expenses
which the judgment for costs was designed to
compensate. For the purpose of determining the
rightful claimant of the judgment for costs, the
insurance company was the actual defendant, and
Munch Brewery, Inc., was simply the nominal defendant. McGregor v. Comstock, 28 N.Y. 237.
There are few other cases in point, but those that
are indicate that a liability carrier providing secondary
insurance, and compelled to pay a claim on behalf of an
insured for whose benefit primary insurance affording
coverage is subsisting, will be permitted to be subrogated
to the rights of the insured against the latter insurer, both
on the ground of general equitable principles and by vir-
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tue of any subrogation clause which may be contained
within the policy issued by the secondary insurer.
In Bennett v. Preferred Accident Insurance Comparny (1951, CA lOth Okla.) 192 F. 2d 748, the court based
its decision upon an equitable doctrine of subrogation described as a device designed to compel, where justified by
the facts and circumstances of the particular case, the
ultimate discharge of a debt or obligation by him who in
good conscience ought to pay it.
In the case on appeal herein appellant incurred attorney fees and court costs in defending the insured and payment for same was made under the policy issued by
National Farmers Union to John Morgan. Pursuant to
the Grief a;nd Bennet cases, appellant should be permitted
to recover the expenses and costs on the basis of subrogation. It is true that Daniel T. Wolfe was the judgmentdebtor in the action against appellant's insured, but
Farmers Insurance Group was defendant in the action
brought by National Farmers Union. Since the sum
sought to be recovered was expended by and for respondents' insured by the terms of appellants' policy and which
amounts should rightly have been paid by respondents in
accordance with the terms of its policy, it is submitted
that National Farmers Union is entitled to and should be
permitted to recover, on the theory of subrogation, the
expenses and costs incurred by it in defending the insured individual.
See also Stan,dard Surety and Casualty Company v.
Metropolitoo Casualty Compa,ny, 45 Ohio L. Abs. 428, 67
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N.E. 2d 634 (1945), Maryland Casualty Company v. Hubbard (1938, D. C. Calif.), 22 F. Supp. 697, National Mutual Insurance Company v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company (1952) 90 App. D.C. 362, 196 F. 2d 597.
PoiNT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND FAILING TO
GRANT JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST DEFENDANT.
On the basis of the law and argument set forth under
Point I and Point II herein which appellant incorporates
and makes a part of its argument under this Point, appellant urges that the action of the trial court in dismissing
plaintiff's Complaint and failing to grant it judgment
against defendant was in error.
Appellant contends under the cases decided in the
jurisdictions mentioned coupled with the principles of
equity, and natural justice, that it should be permitted
to recover the attorney fees and court costs incurred in
defending the insured of both parties to this appeal.
PoiNT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
AMEND THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW TO PROPERLY REFLECT WHAT WAS FOUND AS FACTS BY
THE COURT.
Appellant objected to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as entered by the trial court and made a
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motion to have same modified. The trial court refused to
modify the Findings or Conclusions. The error claimed
by appellant in the trial court's action is as follows:
a. that the judgment entered is based on findings
of fact and conclusions of law not in accordance
with the record and should, therefore, be reversed.
b. that the record does not and will not support
the judgment entered and it should, therefore, be
reversed; and
c. that the findings of fact are not in accordance
with the record and are not sufficient to support
the judgment entered and the court should, therefore, have amended same.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument and authorities, it
appears clear that this court should reverse the decision
and judgment of the District Court and should find the
issues in favor of the plaintiff and should direct the lower
court to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants.
Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHARLIER
D. GARY CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appell(Jffbt.
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